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Did Somebody Say Populism?   






Responding to the recent explosion in scholarly analysis of populism, this paper offers 
a conceptual mapping and critique of the dominant schools of thought within the 
burgeoning field of populism studies. In the first half of the paper we suggest that two broad 
conceptions of populism – one associated with Cas Mudde, the other with Ernesto Laclau – 
have come to dominate the field. Yet neither of these approaches, we argue, are able to 
satisfactorily capture the specificity of contemporary forms of radical politics. Thus, the 
second part of the paper examines possible responses to this conceptual impasse. On the 
one hand, we recommend a move towards more theoretically and sociologically enriched 
accounts of populism, by drawing on the insights and concepts of political sociology, 
political theory and cultural studies. On the other, drawing on recent work by Benjamin De 
Cleen, Jason Glynos and Aurelien Mondon, we suggest a partial reorientation of populism 
towards thinking about populism as a signifier (rather than as a concept). In so doing, we 
conclude with a call for greater sensitivity to, and awareness of, the role that discourses 










Over the past few years there has been a veritable explosion of studies on populism in 
its different manifestations in response to the contemporary rise of right wing movements 
across Europe and Britain and the more modest successes of left wing parties in countries 
like Greece, Spain, Portugal and Scotland. Indeed, populism has become a blanket 
descriptor for ‘resistance’ or ‘insurgent’ politics, with political actors of all stripes and forms 
finding themselves labelled “populist”.1 While the surge of scholarly effort to think through 
the theory and practice of populism is welcome, and has thrown up some interesting 
insights and provocative analyses, taken as a whole, this literature remains curiously 
inchoate, muddled and even misleading.  
 
Against this backdrop, the aims of this article are three-fold. The first is to offer a 




characterize what we see as the two dominant schools of thought that inform these 
definitions. The second aim of the article is to evaluate each of these paradigms, and their 
theoretical offshoots, in light of their conceptual coherence, empirical applicability and 
explanatory potential. The third is to suggest two alternative, potentially reinforcing, routes 
that scholarship on populism can and should take.  
 
In light of these aims, we proffer two overlapping arguments developed across two 
sections of the article. The first is that two broad, but incompatible conceptions of populism 
have come to dominate what was once a more varied, eclectic and multi-disciplinary field of 
inquiry and that neither of these definitions - one which paints it as an ideology and the 
other as a political logic - when operationalized, are able to capture the specificity or 
significance of this allegedly new burst of radical politics. Our second argument is that there 
are at least two possible responses to this conceptual impasse, which are potentially 
mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, we recommend a move away from the 
‘parsimonious’ or ‘minimal’ definitions of populism currently on offer towards a more 
theoretically and sociologically enriched account of populism, one that develops inductively 
from ethnographic work and draws on the insights and concepts of political sociology, 
political theory and cultural studies. It is only through detailed, context specific empirical 
research and careful conceptual reflection that we might discover what the unique features 
of populism, if any, consist in. On the other, drawing on recent work by Benjamin De Cleen, 
Jason Gylnos and Aurelien Mondon, we want to encourage academics to be more curious 
about the uses and abuses of this new trope and explore ‘the work’ that it does in 
disciplining our contemporary political terrain. In this way, we are suggesting that while 
populism may be a blunt instrument both conceptually and empirically, it is in fact a 
powerful signifier that is re-articulating a range of discourses around the future possibilities 
of resistance politics and its relationship to democracy.  
 
Part 1: Mapping Incompatible Populisms: Between an Ideology and a Logic.  
 
This first part of the article offers a conceptual mapping and critique of what we take 
to be the two dominant approaches to populism. In each case we will explore the genus of 
populism that each camp defends, its attendant concepts and the vision of politics that 
emerges from each narrative. We then go on to examine several offshoots of each 
paradigm, exploring the more specific ways in which this concept has been operationalized 
as well as deployed to make political arguments.  
 
A.  Populism as ‘Thin Ideology’ 
 
We begin with the work of Cas Mudde which – often alongside his co-author Cristóbal 
Rovira Kaltwasser – constitutes the most widely cited body of work on contemporary 




highly contested,2 there is something of a Muddean consensus in current political science 
scholarship on populism with a long list of scholars from different backgrounds referencing 
Mudde’s work as their key starting point.3 
 
As is well known, Mudde and his colleagues define populism in relation to ideology. 
Mudde’s oft-quoted definition reads as follows:  
 
‘populism is best defined as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression 
of the volonté general (general will) of the people’.4 
 
In these terms, populism must be understood as a ‘mental map’, accompanied by 
particular discourses, through which people come to understand the world and articulate 
their grievances and aspirations.5 The specific content of these ideas stem from a political 
determination and moral judgment that the well-being of ‘the people’ is being trammeled 
by the special interests of a ‘corrupt elite’. To this extent populism embodies a defensive 
politics seeking to reclaim the putative rights of the common people, treated as a unified 
sovereign entity, against the demands and injunctions of an unaccountable ruling cadre. It 
is, by definition, anti-establishment in ethos and prone to justifying practices and/or policies 
that seek to capture the general will of the people, e.g., referenda and plebiscites, and that 
are responsive to their ‘common sense’.6  Given its restricted set of core concepts - the 
‘pure people’, the ‘corrupt elite’ and ‘general will’ –, however, it must be remembered that 
populism is a thin ideology which gains life and practical purpose only when combined with 
thicker, more established host ideologies such as nationalism or socialism.7 
 
When applied to empirical case studies, the picture of ‘populism in action’ that 
emerges is one driven by the passionate exhortations and gestures of high profile leaders 
(e.g. Hugo Chavez, Marine Le Pen, Jorg Haider) and their associated parties.8 These leaders 
are typically presented as strong and enterprising, although Mudde makes it clear that 
charismatic leadership, while often on display in populist politics, is by no means a 
necessary component of it.9 ‘The people’, by contrast, are often far less visible and when 
they do emerge onto the scene they are depicted as a rather reticent, malleable and small c 
conservative lot. Indeed, Mudde even goes so far as to say that what separates latent 
populist followers from other ‘protest prone’ groups is ‘their reactiveness: they generally 
have to be mobilized by a populist actor, rather than taking the initiative themselves’.10 
Thus, for Mudde and his colleagues, populism is constituted through a hierarchical 
relationship between political leaders and ‘the people’, engineered and sustained primarily 





Despite the very widespread uptake of Mudde’s ‘minimal’ definition among 
comparative political scientists,11 we want to suggest that there are a number of conceptual 
and methodological problems with his conception of populism. The first concerns the genus 
of populism as an ideology. Apart from the fact that Mudde and Kaltwasser say very little 
about the status of the set of ideas that feed into populism or how they hang together, the 
progenitor of term ‘thin ideology’ - Michael Freeden - has politely, but quite firmly refuted 
the equation of these two concepts, arguing that the former (populism) has none of the 
necessary features of the latter (ideology, whether thin or thick), i.e. an intellectual history, 
a vision of a transformative alternative, and ‘the potential to become full’ if it incorporates 
elements of other ideologies.12 Dismissing this elision as incoherent, he describes populism 
as an ‘ideationally insubstantial fingerprint’,13 that is more ‘emaciated’ than thin-centred’.14 
We agree and would add that once this is admitted, then it must also be acknowledged that 
the defining force shaping the content and form of populism is in fact its ‘secondary’ or 
‘host’ ideology. Whether it be mobilizing people to action, constructing a template to make 
sense of the world or providing the basis for a broad national agenda, it is the substantive 
ideological visions of so called ‘populist’ leaders (from right-wing to nationalist to socialist) 
that do all the work in sustaining it and provide most of the explanation about it.15 
 
Leaving aside these doubts about the genus of populism and its conceptual coherence, 
there are also methodological challenges that need to be addressed. One of them is that in 
order to quantify and measure the depth and scope of populism, scholars have preferred to 
shift their gaze from ideology to the discursive content of a leader’s ‘political talk’ which can 
be more easily traced, coded and quantified. Thus, finding populism becomes an exercise in 
word searches and word counting as scholars scour the speeches and manifestos of putative 
populist leaders looking for references to the ‘people’ or the ‘elite’.16 This move to the 
discursive realm is justified because it is seen as the only way in which ideology can be 
operationalized without having to add another theoretical element to the definition.17  
 
Now while we accept that this kind of lexical analysis makes sense if populism is 
reduced to set phrases or specific words, as opposed to a more expansive notion of 
ideology, the problem of what Stijn van Kessell calls ‘degreeism’, i.e., seeing populism as 
(potentially) present everywhere, albeit to different degrees, raises its head.18 After all, how 
do we know when we have moved from an incident of populist rhetoric to a fully-fledged 
populist politics? What is the tipping point, and does it depend on how many times 
reference is made to key terminology (e.g. ‘the people’ or ‘corrupt elite’) or over how long a 
period a discourse is freighted with this language? And, perhaps more importantly, if 
populism is and can be present everywhere through language, then it is not clear why we 
have become so fixated with it. In other words, unless we can develop and operationalize 
populism as a ‘classifier’ concept which is able to demarcate ‘a circumscribed universe of 




politics, then it is less clear why we need to worry about it at all, either conceptually or 
politically. 
 
Having identified what for us are a few of the serious problems with this minimalist 
definition of populism, let’s move on to examine some theoretical offshoots of the 
Muddean approach that seek to further concretize populism as a distinct form of politics. 
The first is put forward by Jan-Werner Müller and Takis Pappas who argue that populism 
must be understood as a form of ‘democratic illiberalism’ and therefore must be treated 
with caution and contained. The second put forward by Benjamin Moffitt prefers to see it as 
the embodiment of a distinct ‘style or performance’ of politics. As we shall see, what holds 
these two strands of thought together is their shared assumption that populism starts life as 
a set of ideas which are then automatically translated into a specific range of actions, policy 
decisions and performances. 
 
Starting with Müller, whose book What is Populism? was compulsory reading for the 
Princeton class of 2021, populism is presented as ‘a particular moralistic imagination of 
politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified … 
people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some way morally inferior’.20 Thus, 
although he does not deploy the term ideology, he clearly sits in the ideational camp, seeing 
populism as primarily fuelled by attitudes, beliefs and values which then orient and give 
meaning to a set of political practices. Moreover, in a similar fashion to the Muddean vision, 
populism is rendered visible and potent through the machinations of a self-appointed leader 
who seeks to gain the trust of and represent a constituency of misguided, angry people who 
seemingly passively follow their charismatic messiah. Finally, alongside Mudde, Müller also 
emphasises the underlying moralistic nature of populist politics in which citizens are pitted 
against each other in a zero-sum game of good vs. evil. Differentiating populists from good 
liberal democrats, Müller explains that the former ‘…will persist in their representative claim 
no matter what; because their claim is of a moral and symbolic – not an empirical – nature, 
it cannot be disproven’ (Muller 2016, emphasis added, p. 39). Leaving aside the bizarre 
notion that only populists are prone to the repetition of erroneous claims, regardless of the 
facts, it is clear that Müller sees moral outrage as one of the lynchpins of populism.  
 
Where he diverts from the Muddean camp is his insistence that the defining feature of 
populism is its anti-pluralism rather than its anti-elitism. While many forms of protest 
politics can take a stand against elites, it is only populists who unapologetically extol the 
virtues of a ‘highly exclusionary identity politics’ in which the ‘real’ or ‘true’ people are 
presented as indivisible and outsiders as a threat to the popular will. It is this anti-pluralism 
which poses the greatest danger to democracy stoking as it does the conditions of 
possibility for not only democratic illiberalism, but also for authoritarianism.21 In this way, 
unlike Mudde, Müller sees no virtues to populism at all, rejecting the idea that it can ever be 




and democracy for Müller and any and all challenges to this creed are beyond the pale. The 
notion that there may be tensions between the defence of liberalism and the practice of 
democracy and that current configurations of global power in a neoliberal age may 
aggravate these, are given little attention in the text.22  
 
In a very similar vein, Pappas, indicts populism as a form of democratic illiberalism 
explaining that it ‘fail(s) to abide by the three most fundamental principles of political 
liberalism, namely, the acknowledgement of multiple divisions in society; the need to try 
reconciling such divisions via negotiated agreements and political moderation; and the 
commitment to the rule of law and the protection of all minority rights’.23 Drawing explicitly 
on Mudde’s definition, he depicts populism as a world view that divides society into the 
good (the people) and the bad (elite) and that generates a politics that is prone to 
confrontation, polarization and ‘political extremism’.24 In this context, Pappas presents 
Syriza and previous Greek governments as dangerous to the extent that they seek to 
override centrist voices speaking out in the name of moderation and economic reform. In 
this way, populism of all hues, left or right, must be seen as a foe of contemporary liberal 
democracy reflecting, as it does, ‘biased beliefs and bad policies’.25  
 
Unlike his colleagues, however, Pappas’s pays much more empirical and conceptual 
attention to the role of ‘the people’ as the sustaining force behind populism. For him, 
populism tends to thrive in countries where liberal political culture has not been embedded 
and therefore the people are less able and willing to act according to the ‘public good’. 
Explaining the rise of populism in Greece, for instance, he suggests that the Greek people 
simply lacked the ‘social capital’ necessary to act in a ‘rational’ and ‘liberal minded’ way, 
seduced as they were by ‘greed’.26 
 
A second trajectory of thinking about populism which has emerged recently— 
exemplified by the work of Moffitt—prefers to conceptualize populism as a ‘style’ of politics.  
Understood as a mode of representation, replete with a ‘playbook’ of mannerisms, gestures 
and aesthetic flourishes, Moffitt tells us that the central features of this performance 
include an ‘appeal to the people’, an indictment of corrupt elites, a coarsening of political 
rhetoric which he characterizes as ‘bad manners’, and last but not least, an evocation of 
crisis – real or imagined – which serves to bring a sense of urgency and drama to the 
leader’s calls for attention.27 Unlike Müller, (but like some of the comparativist scholars who 
operationalise Mudde’s definition), Moffitt sees populism as gradational in nature: in other 
words, leaders choose to perform these elements to a lesser or greater extent with all of 
them embodying some of these features of populism at least some of the time. In this sense 
then populism is construed as an integral part of democratic politics. And although, like 
Mudde, he identifies both positive and negative democratic tendencies within populism, it is 




of power, populism remains a potential danger to any democratic project understood as an 
inclusive or plural one.   
 
Despite Moffitt’s strenuous efforts to establish his perspective as novel and distinct 
from that of prevailing perspectives, in the end, his work does not take us very far away 
from the ideational definition, a point that Mudde himself has correctly noted.28 This is 
because although Moffitt takes the ‘performances’ of populism as the main unit of analysis, 
his framework requires us to see these dramatic gestures and rhetoric as ultimately driven 
and sustained by the ideas and beliefs of those who put them into action. Nowhere in this 
perspective are these acts of representation given a life or logic of their own so that 
populism can be understood as something that exists beyond the intentions of their author. 
In other words, for Moffitt, there can be no performance of populism without a ‘populist’ 
subject ready and willing to enact it, consciously and intentionally, in order to obtain and 
maintain power. This is an agent focused politics of means and ends, one in which strategy 
looms large. Given this focus on instrumental rationality, it is unsurprising that Moffitt says 
next to nothing about the influence of any ‘host ideology’ on these populist performances. 
Moreover, he also fully accepts the ideational content of the populist project as defined by 
Mudde, that is, ‘an appeal to the people’, a view of the elite as corrupt, and a vision of a 
sharply divided society. The introduction of ‘bad manners’ and a ‘sense of crisis’ in this 
context become simply add-ons in an effort to explain how leaders seek to curry favour with 
their followers and thereby secure their appeal to the people. Thus, while one can argue 
that Moffitt draws our attention to an important aspect of populism, i.e, how it is enacted 
and performed, at least by leaders, he does so while working firmly within the ideational 
framework. Even methodologically, Moffitt shares the deductive approach of the Muddean 
camp whereby the essential features of populism are asserted by fiat, drawn as they are 
from the prevailing theories of the day, and not discovered inductively through careful 
empirical or ethnographic research.29  
 
In sum, despite seemingly different starting points, all these authors converge around 
several points. The first is that populism is fundamentally a mind-set and a mental map 
which, when put into practice, leads to a divisive politics in terms of its rhetoric, its 
embodied performances and its policies. The second is that all these thinkers subscribe to a 
deductive form of theorising in which populism is first defined conceptually and then 
rendered visible through the application of the definition to specific case studies. As a result, 
the focus has been on proving the presence, or not, of populism, rather than on exploring 
the conditions or grievances which give rise to it or the nature of the social and political 
relationships that define its particular form. Third, and related to the second, with the 
exception of Pappas’ work, ‘the people’ being targeted by populist discourses are left almost 
entirely in the shadows of their leaders - we are given little sense of who they are, 
empirically or conceptually, and why they should follow or respond to their machinations, 




‘top down’ vision of politics in which individual personalities and intentional strategic action 
is foregrounded. Third, all of these authors, to varying degrees, see populism as a potential 
threat to the political centre ground either in terms of liberal values (pluralism) or in terms 
of economic rationality (neoliberal market reforms). Even Mudde is increasingly framing 
populism as a form of democratic illiberalism in his media interventions.31 
 
B. Populism as a Political Logic 
 
Whilst the work of Cas Mudde has been the dominant influence on the study of populism in 
comparative politics, the work of the late political theorist Ernesto Laclau represents a 
second school of thought that has gained considerable traction amongst scholars in the UK 
and in Europe. Although Laclau’s key contribution to political thought consisted in 
developing, often in collaboration with Chantal Mouffe, a specifically ‘post-Marxist’, 
discourse theory of hegemony,32 populism was an ongoing concern for Laclau throughout 
his career, culminating in the publication of On Populist Reason in 2005. This work, and its 
attendant themes, has become a principal focus of what has been dubbed the ‘Essex School’ 
of discourse theory, Laclau’s home academic institution for more than 30 years. Some of the 
key thinkers working within this Laclauian tradition include Panizza, Howarth, Mouffe, and 
Stavrakakis.33 
 
In On Populist Reason Laclau understands populism as the manifestation of a 
particular logic of ‘articulation’ in which anti-systemic claims and demands are brought 
together into a (relatively) coherent counter-hegemonic formation or ‘equivalential chain’.34 
This temporary, precarious coalition is afforded a semblance of unity firstly by the 
production of ‘empty signifiers’ (i.e., privileged names, concepts or ideals) that serve to 
unite hitherto disparate demands and secondly, by its opposition to a common enemy.35 In 
sharp contrast to team Mudde, what defines populism then is not the ideological content of 
the demands being put forward, but rather the fact that they take a particular form which is 
characterized by what Laclau terms the ‘logic of equivalence’, one of two fundamental logics 
that constitute the very ontological fabric of politics.36 The second for Laclau is the ‘logic of 
difference’ which serves to sustain an institutionalized, differential model of politics which 
presupposes that a plurality of demands can be satisfactorily addressed within the system 
and without recourse to social division and antagonism.37 
 
But this is all very abstract. What specific actors populate populism and whose 
demands drive it? As opposed to the Muddean camp, for whom the emergence of populism 
presupposes an already existing constituency of people seeking to resist the elite that rule 
over them, for the Essex school it is only through populism, and the rhetorical devices, i.e. 
‘empty signifiers’, deployed by their leaders, that ‘the people’ can be constituted as a 
popular subject.38 In other words, the ‘people’ only emerge as a recognizable political 




equivalence and generate new political identities around which subjects can mobilize. While 
the precise content of these new identities is contingent and cannot be known in advance, 
Laclau does characterize ‘the people’ as ‘the underdog’ who, in the context of ‘a crisis of 
representation’39 and heightened antagonism, face down their oppressor.40 Of course, when 
the equivalential chain that articulates them as ‘a people’ with a shared popular identity is 
challenged and eventually breaks, their existence as an ‘objective’ social force also 
dissipates.  
 
As should be obvious, populism in the hands of Laclauians is a very different 
proposition from that envisaged by those following Mudde. While the latter commit to an 
ontic vision and analysis of politics which sees it as an already constituted terrain whose 
meaning and direction can be objectively measured and mapped, even predicted with the 
right conceptual tools, the former see politics as an ongoing, unpredictable and contingent 
play of differences, a game that defies fixed meanings and cannot be studied as an already 
constituted entity. And although it is true that the interplay and tension between these two 
ontological logics of the political are galvanized and sustained through the concrete 
discursive actions (which include words, symbols and practices) of both charismatic leaders 
and grass-roots mobilizations, the trajectory and fate of any populist moment is not 
reducible to them, dependent as it is on a range of discursive contestations and contingent 
events that far exceed the intentions of individuals. 
 
Having now summarized the central claims of the Essex School (and their differences 
from the Muddean approach), let us consider some of the limitations of this perspective. 
One stumbling block takes the form of a conceptual conflation. As Benjamin Arditi points 
out, at times Laclau seems to equate populism with politics writ large and yet, at other 
times, he implies that it is ‘one possibility of politics among others’.41 In other words, he 
vacillates between an ontological and ontic conception of populism.42 But even if we 
sidestep this conceptual slippage, we still have a problem with his notion of populism as a 
manifestation of counter-hegemony because it suggests that all oppositional or radical 
politics must be conceived as populist in nature. If this is the case then populism loses any 
specificity of its own and becomes just another way of characterizing radical politics of all 
persuasions.  
 
Of course, this move may well have been acceptable to Laclau, given that for him 
‘populist reason’ constituted a logic of the political as such, but it is clearly not what 
contemporary scholars using the term want to imply. Indeed, populism in this camp is most 
often used to identify and defend a politics of the left, one that is plural, inclusive and 
egalitarian in orientation. And although Laclau made it clear that what he referred to as the 
‘ontic contents’ of populism could never be predetermined and was open to articulatory 
practices from both the right and the left, his advocates such as Stavrakakis have not 




given that the key nodal points in their discourses revolve around the ‘nation’ or ‘ethnicity’, 
rather than ‘the people’.43 In this way while the operationalization of the concept of 
populism, in the Laclauian camp, encourages us to look for and make a distinction between 
right and left radical politics – a point that is obscured in the Muddean approach – it does 
not help us go much beyond this point when it comes to determining the specificity of 
populism in relation to other instantiations of oppositional politics. 
 
Relatedly, a further problem, that also blights the work of those working in the Essex 
school, is that in the course of its operationalization the genus of populism tends to morph 
from a political logic to a discourse (it is hard to map a logic!) and then from there to a series 
of rhetorical devices and utterances, despite the fact that Laclau explicitly and emphatically 
rejects the conflation of ‘discourse’ with either ideology or language.44  As evidence of this 
tendency, witness the otherwise rich and interesting accounts offered by Stavrakakis and 
Katsambekis, which reduce the analysis of left-wing populism in Greece to overt references 
to ‘the people’ in the discourses of the Greek governing party SYRIZA.45 Interestingly and 
rather oddly, this propensity to distil populism, at least when empirically mapping it, to a 
series of discursive utterances on the part of both the Essex School and the followers of 
Mudde has nurtured a curious ‘love-in’ between these two camps. So much so that 
members on each side happily reference each other despite the fact that they are 
committed to diametrically opposed conceptions of populism and politics.46 This in turn 




In sum, despite their different, indeed incompatible, ontological starting points, both 
approaches reviewed here share a great deal. First, they both see populism as a form of 
resistance or oppositional politics that potentially poses a serious challenge to the status 
quo. Moreover, both camps identify and examine populism through a process of deductive 
theorizing, which, when operationalized, tends to foreground the language of individual 
leaders or the slogans of groups. To this extent, they tend to neglect a range of other 
features often associated with the politics of resistance in more sociologically oriented 
literatures. Indeed, as we shall suggest below, the politics that emerges into view in each 
case is a strangely dis-embodied and dis-embedded one. Last but not least, we suggest that 
both conceptual accounts of populism fail to demonstrate in what ways populism can be 
understood as a distinct mode or form of politics, one which can be differentiated from an 
ephemeral feature of politics that leaders dip in and out of, on the one hand (the degreeism 
problem), and from other forms of oppositional or radical politics, on the other.  
 
 





 Rather surprisingly, the ‘thinness’ of dominant conceptualizations of populism has done 
nothing to slow down its meteoric rise as the term of the hour in academic and media 
circles. In fact, in our view, what we are witnessing at present is a degree of conceptual 
overreach that threatens to swamp all our analyses of and discourses about contemporary 
politics, radical or not. A further worry is that the ascendancy of this concept has been 
accompanied by a tendency to eschew careful, nuanced analysis with the aim of 
understanding emergent forms of politics in favour of brash judgements and indignant 
anger at any and all challenges to the centre ground of politics. So where do we go from 
here? Given the conceptual difficulties that we think have beset the category of populism as 
well as its operationalization, we want to propose two alternative routes out of the 
conceptual impasse in which we find ourselves. The first is what could be framed as 





The first option would be to pursue a project of conceptual renewal, aiming to develop a 
conceptualization of populism that 1) is able to make good on the implicit promise offered 
up in the existing scholarship that there is something significant, distinct and unusual about 
populism, and 2) avoids the conceptual and empirical pitfalls that we identified in part 1. For 
us, the most fruitful way of doing this would likely be to drop any and all allusions to either 
ideology or discourse (especially in its literal conception) as the appropriate genus of 
populism, especially if we want to develop a conceptual tool that is amenable to empirical 
inquiry.  
 
Instead, we think that is more promising to rethink populism in light of a much smaller 
body of literature on populist movements which tends to be ignored in part because it is far 
more eclectic, sociological in orientation and case study based. Here populism is presented 
as a series of collective enactments that, while mobilizing ideologies, discourses, and forms 
of rhetoric, cannot be reduced to them. Moreover, these enactments are not seen as 
ephemeral performances by leaders, but rather as embedded, relatively durable and 
purposeful ‘repertoires of action’ that reflect a substantive view of the world and a desire to 
transform it. Understanding and conceptualizing populism from this point of view requires 
us to examine what a range of actors actually do and when, where and how they do it. To 
this end, it implicitly advocates an inductive approach which recognizes the context 
specificity of populism and admits that many of its defining features depend on the socio-
economic, cultural and historical/regional terrain on which it emerges and finds life and, 
therefore, cannot be determined or deduced a priori.47 Finally, rather than seeing populism 
as emanating from the ideas and actions of a leader, it presents it as a two-way street in 
which leaders of political parties and social movements as well as grassroots activists all 




instance, Jansen sees populism as the mobilization of ‘ordinarily marginalized social 
sectors’,48 an endeavour which implicates not only material and organizational resources 
but also the articulation of an animating rhetoric which brings people together against a 
perceived common enemy.49 
 
Learning from this more social-movement oriented approach, we would like to 
propose that we reframe the genus of populism so that it centres on a dynamic social 
relationship that is generated and sustained between political leaders and ‘the people’ that 
are inspired to ‘follow’ them. In other words, rather than search for the intrinsic 
characteristics of populist actors and their discourses, it might be more enlightening to 
explore the ways in which both the leaders and ‘the led’ co-constitute each other through 
the interplay of their respective discursive claims, the embodied performances that 
accompany them and, in particular, the bonds and emotions generated by them. With little 
space to develop this idea, we simply want to gesture here to two lines of inquiry that may 
be worth exploring as we attempt to grasp populism as a potentially sui generis mode of 
resistance politics. 
 
The first concerns the role of affect. It is our view that the specificity of populism – as 
a distinctive type of ‘socially produced reciprocity’50 – might be partly captured by 
considering the affective dynamics that constitute it. Defining affect is, of course, a 
troublesome task. But a helpful definition for our purposes is offered by Jon Protevi, who 
argues that affect potentially encompasses two different, but connected facets of human 
experience: on the one hand, affect refers to ‘being affected’ – ‘the somatic change caused 
by an encounter with an object’ and on the other, it references ‘the felt change in the power 
of the body, the increase or decrease in perfection, felt as sadness or joy’, i.e. something 
akin to what we might ordinarily call ‘emotion’, but that is not reducible to it.51 
 
If affect matters to politics, in general, and possibly populism, in particular, how might 
we begin to gauge its role and effects? Jenny Gunnarsson Payne’s fascinating recent essay 
on populism, affect and political mobilization suggests a number of potential avenues for 
research. Drawing on Laclau, Gunnarsson Payne stresses two key moments in the process of 
(populist) identity formation: first, the vertical dimension, which captures the ways in which 
‘political subjects are affected by a political idea or leader and come to identify (invest in) 
with a political project’; and second, the horizontal level, which highlights how political 
subjects ‘affect each other… in the formation of political collectivities’.52 What might be 
specific to populism then, is an intense form of affective investment along both of these 
trajectories simultaneously, i.e. subjects identify with a specific political leader and, in so 
doing, affirm their sense of communion with a broader political community who feel the 
same way. Seen in this way, populism becomes, among other things, a series of 
performative acts in which the distinction between the identity of the ‘leader’ and that of 




potentially useful starting point for exploring the particular dynamics of populism, it is clear 
to us that more conceptual and empirical work is required before this conceptual category 
can make good on the promise of being able to pin down the specificity of populist politics.  
 
A second, and connected way of comprehending the ‘staying power’ of populism, 
concerns the epistemic dimension of populist politics. For our intuition here is that the 
affective force of populism may derive, at least in part, from its capacity to articulate a 
shared epistemic narrative capable of speaking to and from the experiences, needs, wants 
and feelings of a ‘voiceless’ cohort of people. Indeed, drawing on Saurette and Gunster’s 
account of what they call ‘epistemological populism’, we suggest that populism’s 
distinctiveness might lie in its capacity to affirm and valorise the ‘everyday’ knowledge of 
‘ordinary citizens’.53 In other words, the everyday experiences of individuals become 
elevated as the ground for valid knowledge as opposed to academic or scientific expertise.54 
Thus, knowledge is presented, on the one hand, as highly personal – each individual’s 
experience is valid and telling - and, on the other, as a collective endeavour to the extent 
that it emerges from the accumulation of these individualized ‘common sense truths’.   
 
Armed with the common sense of the people, the next step in the development of a 
populist politics requires the acknowledgment of the deeply felt grievances and frustration 
of these ordinary citizens. After all, the scholars of both camps examined here concede that 
populism is a response to real or imagined power relations which are perceived to 
marginalize certain constituencies, e.g., Laclau’s ‘underdog’. It follows that any aspiring 
leader(s) will need to construct a political language that gives expression to what feminist 
philosopher Mirander Fricker calls ‘epistemic injustice’. More concretely, in our view, 
Fricker’s notion of ‘hermeneutical injustice’ – one of two types of epistemic injustice that 
she discusses - can help us to capture the disadvantage that some groups have when it 
comes to articulating their social experiences and rendering it intelligible to others.55 This 
silencing effect, for Fricker, stems from the fact that members of marginalized communities 
are simply less able to participate in the practices that produce the prevailing social 
meanings of their community and, therefore, have less access to and understandings of 
these collective ‘hermeneutical resources’. To put it another way, people in this group suffer 
from a ‘situated hermeneutical inequality’.56 The challenge then for anyone attempting to 
represent these neglected groups is to tap into these resources and construct a narrative 
that gathers together the experiences and grievances of individuals and weaves them into a 
story of collective oppression. Whether understood in these terms or in others, the process 
of developing, articulating and communicating effectively the ‘subjugated knowledges’ of 
subordinated groups is, in our view, crucial if we are to move towards an understanding of 
the origins and nature of populism as a distinct mode of politics.57  
 
Both these proposed moves challenge the existing definitions of populism, treating it 




of the concepts we deploy and the nature of the theorizing and empirical research we 
engage in. After all, taking the role of affect and epistemic injustice seriously pushes back 
against the privileging of strategic rationality, present in much of the Muddean literature, 
and introduces two embedded and embodied features of our political experience which are 
only hinted at in the Laclauian literature on populism and could be lucratively developed.  
To be clear, we are not saying that a consideration of the affective and epistemic 
dimensions of populism will necessarily lead us to see it as a distinct mode of radical politics. 
What we are saying is that permitting ourselves to drop the pursuit of a minimalist 
definition in favour of a more complex, inductive and sociologically sensitive approach may 
help us pin down the specificity of populism, if indeed there is any to be found.  
 
2) Use and Abuse of the Term Populism 
 
A second potentially lucrative route for populism scholars would be to reorient the focus 
of populism studies in such a way that its analytic value no longer hinges on demarcating 
populism as a distinct form of politics. We take our lead here from a recent, provocative 
intervention by Benjamin De Cleen, Jason Glynos and Aurelien Mondon, who call for, among 
other things, an inquiry into populism’s role as signifier and not just as a concept.58 To do so 
would require us to be more curious about how discourses about populism circulate within 
the media and academia and the effect they have on shaping the contours of contemporary 
public debate. Heeding their entreaty to ‘turn our attention to how the term is used, by 
whom and why, and with what performative effects’,59 does not require us to give up on our 
efforts to demarcate ‘actually-existing’ forms of populist politics, but it does encourage us to 
take some critical distance from our subject matter and be willing to entertain the idea that 
we are proliferating a term that, at the moment, does far more work politically than it does 
analytically. 
  
In our view, there are at least two ways in which populism as a signifier serves to act on 
and mould our contemporary political imagination. The first concerns the intentional and 
unintentional use of the term in both media and academic discourses to identify and 
publicly label certain forms of politics as potentially dangerous at best, and beyond the pale 
at worst.60 So for example, in a short but informative critical analysis of political discourses 
in the Greek context, Stavrakakis et al. point out how populism - in this case read Syriza - is 
framed in terms of metaphors that cast it as an illness either of the body or of the mind, or 
as, variously, animalistic or monstrous.61 Similarly, in Britain, Corbyn and the activism that 
has galvanized around him and his project, has also been deemed to be populist by many a 
commentator,62 again, with the aim of designating his particular rendition of left politics as a 
threat to the ‘soft’ or ‘centre’ left of the Labour Party and moderate politics in the UK more 
generally. Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, the bulk of academic attention has been 
directed towards right wing forms of populism from Brexit in the UK to the election of 




in Austria. As all these highly diverse cases are stripped of any context specificity and 
instead blended together into one populist pot, we are presented with a picture of 
contagion in which each case of populism ignites and fosters other eruptions across borders. 
With the spread of ‘illiberalism’ quickening its pace, any sign of populism, whether left or 
right, must be taken seriously and contained before it can take root.  
 
In addition to marginalizing certain specific strands of radical politics, we also need to 
explore how the narrative about populism is being mobilized to sustain more generalized 
discourses about the nature of politics at this conjuncture. So for example, it is notable how 
the elevation of populism as the political scourge of the 21st century has been accompanied 
by renewed, fervent calls to set aside the apparently anachronistic left-right distinction in 
favour of alternative characterizations of political conflict e.g., the antagonism between 
‘open societies’ and ‘closed ones’ as the Economist put it, or between the ‘people from 
somewhere’ vs the ‘people from anywhere’, as David Goodhart prefers to frame it,63 or 
between ‘globalization losers’ vs its ‘winners’, as Tony Blair would have it. It would seem 
that populism, along with these new cleavages that allegedly spur it on, is threatening to 
trump what Steven Lukes has called “the grand dichotomy of the 20th century”.64  
 
As we can see, the ‘populist hype’, as Glynos and Mondon characterize it, cannot be 
understood simply as an ‘innocent’ outburst on the part of confused academics, but rather 
needs to be evaluated as a political logic which not only ‘misrepresents what is going on’ in 
the world, but also serves ‘to marginalise meaningful debate about the way democracies 
tend to operate’.65 As such this logic, and the anti-populist discourses it engenders and 
sustains, need to become a focal point of research for those of us who remain committed to 
rich, sociological research as a way of developing and testing our political concepts, on the 
one hand, and to the survival of the left-right distinction as a crucial political and normative 
marker for thinking and acting politically, on the other.66 To give them their due, it is only 
through the efforts of those in the Laclauian camp, in general, and of Stavrakakis, in 
particular, that the politics of anti-populism has come under any scrutiny.67 While much 
more work needs to be done, it is clear that the current ‘populist hype’, at least in part, 
represents a form of ‘liberal angst’ that has accompanied the recognition that the politics of 
the putative ‘centre’ ground is in crisis after its failure to undergo a meaningful ideological 
renewal in the post-recession era. The splatter gun characterization of any and all 
challenges to mainstream liberal politics as ‘populist’ (irrespective of whether those 
challenges come from the left, the far right or even, as with Macron, from the centre itself) 
is indicative of this insecurity. To pursue a shift in populism studies from populism-as-
concept to populism-as-signifier thus has the potential to shed light on the broader 








We started this article by offering a general mapping of the current conceptual terrain 
within the field of populism studies and argued that, despite implicit and explicit claims that 
populism constitutes a distinct mode of politics worthy of study in its own right, existing 
definitions of the phenomenon do not adequately make the case for its sui generis nature. 
We went on to note that both approaches reviewed here share a curious tendency to 
operationalize populism in terms of the discursive utterances of elite politicians and, in this 
way, inadvertently end up blurring the boundaries between, and the contributions of, their 
respective conceptual approaches.  
In response to what we see as a conceptual impasse, we have suggested that one 
could cautiously pursue either a project of conceptual renewal or one of reorientation, or 
indeed both. To this end, we suggested that there might be mileage in framing populism as 
a distinctive mode of affective and epistemic politics. However, we argue that considerably 
more empirical investigation remains to be done if the potential of these concepts to deliver 
a robust notion of populism is to be fulfilled. Following Yannis Stavrakakis and Benjamin De 
Cleen and others, a second route would be to shift our attention from populism-as-concept 
to populism-as-signifier, paving the way for a critical analysis of discourses about populism, 
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